In this chapter Howard Raiffa discusses the evolution of decision analysis and his personal involvement in its development. He describes the early days of Operations Research (OR) in the late 1940's with its approach to complex, strategic decision making.
As the field of OR matured, mathematical researchers isolated key recurrent problemslike queueing problems-and used advanced mathematical techniques to get analytical solutions.
The name of the game became simplification of reality to make mathematical analysis feasible.
Then these analytically motivated abstractions were gradually made more intricate as the body of mathematical techniques grew. The trend went from elementary analysis of complex, illstructured problems to advanced analysis of well-structured problems. In OR departments, mathematical elegance displaced the old quest for making empirically based contributions to messy real problems. A sign of maturity, I suppose.
In the early days of OR, descriptions of complex realities used probabilities and one did not worry too much if these were judgmentally biased, but as the field "matured," probabilities were increasingly confined to the objective domain and interpreted as long-run frequencies.
There was no hint of how to best elicit subjective, judgmental information from experts about uncertainties or in identifying and structuring multiple conflicting objectives.
I suspect that my continuing interest in prescriptive decision analysis had its roots firmly planted in that first academic type of job I had as a so-called "operations researcher." In that role, I was initiated into the cult that examined the world through decision-enhancing binoculars:
What's the problem? Who are the decision makers? What advice would I give? A blatant, prescriptive, advice-giving orientation.
From OR to Game Theory to Statistical Decision Theory
Advances: Decision Analysis Personal Wald, who knew more about the subject than I.
My Gradual Disillusionment with Classical Statistics
Besides teaching decision theory a lá Wald, I also had to teach the basic courses in statistics-the usual stuff on testing hypotheses, confidence intervals, unbiased estimation. These courses were mostly concerned with problems of inference, and little attention was paid to the integration of inference and decision. When I studied those problems more carefully, I felt that the frequencybased material on inference was not so much wrong but largely irrelevant for decisional purposes. I began not to believe what I was teaching.
Advances: Decision Analysis Personal The seminal book by Savage (1954) did not so much convert me to the subjectivist camp-I was already converted intellectually by the time I read this bible-but it convinced me that I was on the right track.
At Columbia, I was a member of the interdisciplinary Behavioral Models Projectactually, as the junior faculty member of the project, I was appointed the chair of that projectand Duncan Luce and I worked on what was supposed to be a 50-page expository article (one of many on different topics) and this turned into our book, Games and Decisions (Luce and Raiffa 1957 Pearson had it all wrong: The way to go was to closely knit the study of uncertainties with business decisions. He also was not aware of the rumblings in the field. So he began teaching his own version of statistical decision theory based on subjective probability assessments of expert, business managers-making it up as he went along. I recognized genius when I saw it and I became his personal mathematics tutor-the best student I ever had-and we worked together on developing statistics for an astute business manager.
From Closet Bayesian to Proselytizer
It didn't take long, working with Schlaifer, that I too got religion and gained the necessary conviction that the subjective school was the right school-certainly for business decisions-and I came out of the closet and began preaching the gospel according to Bayes' disciples.
It was now 1958, and we were convinced that our mission was to spread the gospel. Even statisticians who were on our side in the philosophical debates about the foundations were skeptical about implementing it. They felt: (1) The subjective (Bayesian) approach is all too complicated, and (2) real experts won't cooperate by giving judgmental information.
In 1958, Schlaifer and I set out to prove that whatever the objectivists could do, we subjectivists could also do-only better-and in 1961, we published a compendium of results entitled Applied Statistical Decision Theory (ASDT) (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961) . It was much more a reference volume than a textbook. We deemed our efforts a success.
Advances: Decision Analysis Personal
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At the same time, during this period, we and some of our students did get out into the field and collected judgmental probabilities galore from real experts about real events. (A good many of these experts were design engineers and marketing specialists from DuPont and Ford.)
We proved to ourselves that we were on the right path. We were not troubled by the problem of expert cooperation but about the quality of their judgmental inputs. We learned how to ask for the input data we needed by the proper framing of questions. We told our experts to expect incoherencies in their responses to our hypothetical questions and those incoherencies should only prompt them to think even more deeply about their expertise. We learned not to ask questions one way or another way, but to ask both ways and to confront resulting incoherencies in an open manner. We learned that the experts calibrated better if questions were posed in terms of assets rather than in incremental monetary amounts and that by and large their judgmental inter quartile ranges were too tight-rather than capturing half the true uncertain quantities, they were capturing only a third. We became experts in the art of soliciting judgmental information.
I'm reminded here of the complaint that it seems wrong to build a logical edifice on such imperfect input data, to which Jimmy Savage responded, "Better to construct a building on shifting sands than on a void." Here, the "void" being no use of judgment inputs.
Our book, ASDT, had at best a very limited circulation when published in 1961, but in the year 2000 it was republished by Wiley in their Classic Series.
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Decision Trees
Because many of our business students were bright but mathematically unsophisticated, I
formulated most problems in terms of decision trees, which became very standard fare. The standard statistical paradigm, involving a decision whose payoff depended on an uncertain population parameter, was presented in a four-move decision tree:
Move 1 (decision node). Choice of an experiment (e.g., sample size).
Move 2 (chance node). Sample outcome.
Move 3 (decision node). Choice of a terminal act.
Move 4 (chance node). Revelation of the true population parameter.
Associated to any path through the tree was a known payoff value.
When I taught objectivist-based statistical decision theory at Columbia, I had little need for the decision tree because objectivists shunned the use of any probabilistic assessment at Moves 2 and 4. The only probabilities the objectivists would allow were conditional probabilities of sample outcomes given assumed population values. The subjectivists use not only this class of probabilities, but also prior probabilities over the population parameters-prior meaning before the revelation of sample evidence-and from these inputs and the use of Bayes' formula the subjectivist can derive appropriate probabilities to enter at Moves 2 and 4. Hence the appellations of "Bayesian." I got so used to the use of decision trees in communicating with my students that I couldn't formulate any problem without drawing a decision tree and I was referred to as "Mr. Decision Tree," and what I did was "Decision-Tree Analysis." It took a few years to drop the "tree" from that appellation. Ch. 04 060418 V07
From Statistical Decision Theory to Managerial Economics (1961-1964)
The three years from 1961-1964 were frenetic, and in retrospect, quite productive. First, Schlaifer and I were joined by John Pratt and we wrote a more user-friendly version of ASDT for classroom consumption, replete with hundreds, if not thousands, of exercises and caselets.
McGraw-Hill distributed a preliminary version of this unfinished book (1965), all 1,000 pages, in a cardboard blue binder and the book was called the "blue monster" or Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory (ISDT). It was not published as a finished book until a delay of four decades, only after Schlaifer's demise in 1994 and after my retirement in 1994, and the reason is a bit crazy in retrospect. We (Schlaifer and I, and not Pratt) simply lost interest in pursuing the standard and much too binding statistical decision theory paradigm. We no longer thought of ourselves as applied statisticians but as "managerial economists." We thought the transformation in outlook was profound, and no longer did we have time to polish a book that was too narrow in scope. After publishing ASDT, I had time to study case after case in the MBA repertoire of cases, and it was crystal clear that managers galore needed some systematic way of thinking about their decision problems, which were overwhelmingly concerned with uncertainties that needed the judgmental inputs of managers. The statistical paradigm was out of kilter, was hobbling. A typical business decision problem might involve several uncertainties, and some of them required the judgments of production managers or marketing specialists or financial experts with no possibility of accumulating sampling evidence. To force those problems into a statistical decision format was too cumbersome. At about that time, I also supervised the thesis of Jack
Grayson, who was interested in describing how oil wildcatters made decisions. I got him to adopt Advances: Decision Analysis Personal Page 13 of 27 Ch. 04 060418 V07 a more prescriptive orientation that dealt not only with physical uncertainties-is there oil down there and how much-but the sharing of risks and the formation of syndicates (Grayson, 1962 
From Business and Statistics to Business and Economics (1964-1968)
I received an offer I could hardly refuse: a joint chair endowed by the Business School and the Economics Department, and because these two behemoth organizations could not agree on a name for the professorship I was invited to select a name. I became the Frank P. Ramsey
Professor of Managerial Economics. I never had a course in economics and was a bit apprehensive, but they appointed me because they realized, as I did, that the theory of risky choice should be an integral part of economics. I also must admit that I needed to establish some space between Schlaifer and myself.
From Managerial Economics to Decision Analysis
Although I now was a member of the Economics Department and my title dubbed me a managerial economist, I increasingly became interested in classes of problems that had little to (Raiffa, 1968) . Much later, I learned that Professor Ronald Howard of Stanford, one of the key developers of the field now called decision analysis, had independently adopted that name for his enterprise (Howard 1966) . Evidently the time was ripe. I essentially taught the same thing in the Economics Department that I taught at the B-School, but the cases were different. Instead of maximizing expected profits, the objective functions became more complex and group decision making needed more attention.
My RAND Experience and the Development of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)
I was invited by Charles Wolfe to spend the summer of 1964 at RAND studying and critiquing the methodology used in their reports. Not infrequently, I found that not enough attention was given to the recognition of competing, interrelated objectives of the analysis, and this resulted in a misspecification of the objective function to optimize. Also all too often, the hard drove out the soft. I wrote a RAND report on decisions with multiple objectives and in that report I first introduced notions of preferential and utility independence (Raiffa 1969 He himself, with a hand calculator, made the medical rounds surrounded by a half a dozen eager students, and he would all but lay out a decision tree and work his way backward. I had more 
The Decision and Control Nonprogram (1965-1975)
Harvard never had a department or center in operations research, and there was no substantial support to create such a center. So a few of us dedicated faculty decided to act on our own.
Without any clearance from the faculty of arts and sciences or the B-School, a dozen of us met informally and mapped out a coordinated set of eight one-semester courses in what we dubbed decision and control (D&C) to be given regularly and spread out over three departments: the Division of Engineering and Applied Physics (now the Division of Applied Science), the Department of Statistics, and the Department of Economics. The courses were designed to be given in different departments, all with the same strong mathematical prerequisites, and care was taken to avoid scheduling conflicts. The courses were decision analysis, statistics, probability Ch. 04 060418 V07 models, game theory, mathematical programming, control of dynamic systems, and an integrative seminar. There was no budget, no formal committee, no secretary, no request for any approval of any faculty. Ph.D. students who took these coordinated sets of courses were enrolled in different departments. It was all low key, and students who completed this program were given a letter from me, as the honcho organizer, attesting to their superior training. Imagine-it worked like a charm for a whole decade. It took a bit of chicanery to have these eight courses listed together in the division's course catalogue.
The D&C program worked, but not perfectly because we had no fellowship money to 
On Becoming a Negotiation Analyst
Negotiating the Creation of IIASA (1967 IIASA ( -1972 From 1967-1972 I was a member of the U.S. team that negotiated with the Soviet Union and ten other countries, both east and west, in establishing the International Institute for Applied Systems Advances: Decision Analysis Personal Page 18 of 27 Ch. 04 060418 V07 Analysis (IIASA). This took place during the height of the Cold War and was a confidencebuilding gesture. I learned a lot about the theory and practice of many-party negotiations in the presence of extreme cultural differences.
Directing IIASA from 1972 IIASA from -1975 As the first director of IIASA, I continued in my apprenticeship role as negotiator but I added the skills of an intervener in disputes (facilitator of group interactions, mediator, and arbitrator). I had, I believe, some natural talents, but it was a self-discovery method of learning. I lacked any prior expertise from a program of training in the art and science of negotiation. In 1975, I
decided to return to Harvard to learn about negotiations, rather than continue at IIASA or becoming a dean at some other university. (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) I taught a very popular course on negotiations at the B-School in the late 1970s that was for me a laboratory with well-motivated student-subjects. The students were partially graded on how well they did on various simulation exercises, and I learned enough about negotiations to write a book about it (Raiffa 1982 ). This was not decision analysis, but perhaps a claim can be made for its inclusion in the broader field of decision sciences. After all, negotiations are all about group decision making.
Back to Harvard and Learning about the Art and Science of Negotiation

The Program on Negotiation (1982-)
In the early 1980s, Roger Fisher, coauthor of Getting to Yes (Fisher and Ury, 1981) and I-more
Roger than myself-established another administrative innovation. We created an Harvard's infrastructure and draws no funds from the university. Initially, it was funded by the Hewlitt Foundation, but for the last ten years it earned its own way by offering executive educational programs with largely donated faculty time. It is financially secure enough now to offer pre-doctoral and some post-doctoral research fellowships, run a clearinghouse for the distribution of simulated exercises, sponsor a journal on negotiations, offer a prestigious award for the Negotiator of the Year, and run ongoing seminars.
From Decision Analysis to Policy Analysis and to Societal Risk Analysis
Nuclear Energy Policy Study (NEPS)
When I The Committee on Risk and Decision Making (1980-1982) Following 
Post-Retirement Reflections
Decision Making-a Critical Life Skill I completely missed the boat when I published Decision Analysis (Raiffa 1968) . I was so enamored of the power and elegance of the more mathematical aspects of this emerging field that I ignored the nonmathematical underpinnings: how to identify a problem or opportunity to be analyzed, how to specify the objectives of concern, how to generate the alternatives to be analyzed. All this was given short shrift. All that nonmathematical starting stuff was ignored.
Well, John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, and I, in Smart Choices (1999) , try to correct that. It reaches out to the general public and offers coaching advice to practically everybody on how to make better personal and workplace decisions.
A New Look at Negotiation Analysis
The boundaries between individual decision making (decision analysis), interactive decision making (game theory), behavioral decision making, and joint decision making (as in negotiations) should be porous but aren't. A partial synthesis of these strands is attempted in Raiffa (2002) 
The Need for a New Field Called Decision Sciences
I truly believe that decision making-both individual and group; descriptive, normative, and prescriptive-is an important life skill that can be and should be taught broadly in our society. I think the right umbrella term for what I have in mind is decision science, and I hope that in your lifetime, if not mine, there will be departments of decision sciences created in our universities that will give undergraduate and graduate courses in this subject with many, many electives.
Game theory (extended far beyond equilibrium theory) and negotiation theory (broadly interpreted to include conflict management, resolution, and avoidance, as well as the growing field of alternate dispute resolution) should be a part of this developing discipline. In this department of decision sciences there should be courses on societal risk analysis, and even on organizational design and on the structure of constitutions. There's a lot to be taught and a lot more to be learned: two prerequisites for a field of study. The decision sciences department should establish strong ties to the professional schools (especially business, public policy, public health, medicine), to the engineering school, to the departments of economics, psychology, government, mathematics, statistics, philosophy, and especially to the school of education. So let's get on with it.
